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SOME NOTES ON THE WARSAW
CONVENTION OF 1929
By ARNOLD W. KNAUTH
Member of the New York Bar; Harvard A.B., 1912; Columbia and
Harvard Law Schools, 1915. Since 1936, Member of the American
Section of the International Technical Committee of Aerial Legal
Experts (CITEJA), delegate to many meetings thereof. Editor of
U. S. Aviation Reports since 1928; contributor of the Aviation Law
Chapter to the Annual Survey of American Law. During World
War I he was Assistant Director of Insurance, U.S.S.B. Emergency
Fleet Corporation; and during World War II admiralty trial coun-
sel of the Department of Justice.
M OST of the readers of this JOURNAL may, be assumed to know
that the Warsaw Convention of 1929' regulates the ordinary
relations of air carriers with their passengers (including baggage) and
also with their customers who ship and receive air cargoes; and that
it has been widely ratified by many states, large and small; 2 and gov-
erns most of the international air traffic of the world.s They also know
that it is the domestic law of Britain,4 and of the numerous British
Colonies, 5 and of the various parts of-other colonial systems - French,
Dutch, Belgian, Italian, Spanish."
In effect, the Convention means that in an air disaster the air car-
rier is required to pay each passenger's full provable damages up to
an international gold standard figure of which the 1946 equivalent in
United States dollars is $8,291; 7 the passenger recovers up to this sum
1 U. S. Treaty Series No. 876; 49 U.S. Stat. at L. 3000; 1934 USAvR 245; 3
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 486; text of Convention may be found p. 87 ff., infra,
of this issue of the JOURNAL.
2 Ratifications and Adherences to the Warsaw Convention are listed in 1944
USAvR 85, to which list should be added Egypt (1945).
3 The Convention applies proprio vigore to "international carriage" which is
defined in Article 1 to be(a) carriage from one ratifying State to another;
(b) carriage between two points in a ratifying State via an agreed for-
eign stopping place.
This was deemed to be the furthest sure extent of applicability, without risking
that courts of non-ratifying States could refuse to give effect to the Convention.
4 British Carriage by Air Act, 1932; 22 & 23 Geo. v. ch. 36; 1933 USAvR
299.
5 71 British colonial enactments are listed at 1944 USAvR 86 and in SHAW-
cROSS & BEAUMONT, Air Law, §1751.
0 These colonial extensions, as of 1939, are listed at 1944 USAvR 85-87. It
is too soon to say with assurance what effect the current postwar modifications
of colonial status will have on the effectiveness of the Convention as local law
in various localities.
7 The Convention fixes 125,000 French gold francs of 900/1000 finess and
65% milligrams-Article 22(4). This was the French "PoincarV franc of 1929.
Some equivalents in other currencies have been:
1929 1933 1946
USA dollars 5,000 8,291.87 8,291.87
British pounds 1,000 1,000 2,000
French francs 125,000 250,000 1,000,000
German marks 20,000 20,000 80,000
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without any showing of negligence or fault" unless the air carrier can
prove that it and its servants - including those in the airplane - were
free from all fault.9 This proviso envisages that the carrier may escape
liability if he proves that the accident was caused by a bolt of light-
ning, the unpreventable act of a maniac, an enemy attack or the like.
On the other hand, the passenger may recover unlimited provable
damages if he can prove that the carrier was negligent in an excep-
tional degree, stated in the official French text as dol,'0 presently trans-
lated as "wilful misconduct."
As to baggage, the passenger is similarly situated, the standard gold-
value recoveries being at present $16.58 per kilo for checked baggage"
and $331.67 for whatever the passenger carries on his person or in his
hands.12 As to cargo, the rule is similar to that for ocean vessels under
the Qcean Bill of Lading Convention signed at Brussels in 192413 -
namely, the air carrier is responsible unless he can make out either of
two defenses: proof of how the loss happened and that there was no
negligence connected with it (lightning, enemy act, etc.) 14 or proof
that the loss occurred because of an error in piloting or navigation of
the aircraft by the flying personnel." This useful law has governed
many thousands of flights in England and from and to England since
1932, to and from the United States since 1933, and between all the
states of Europe (except Portugal) for some 5 or 6 years before air traf-
fic was disrupted by the commencement of World War II in September,
1939. During the war years, it applied to several important routes
conducted for civilians. Since active shooting ended in May and
August 1945, it has governed the rapidly expanded international serv-
ices of the postwar era. Despite the seven-year hiatus of the war years
in Europe, there is beginning to be a substantial fund of experience
as to the workings of this law.
Shortly before the war, a movement was noted to "revise" the
Convention. Since the war, the effort to revise it has engaged a good
deal of time. The revisions discussed fall into three groups:
(1) To simplify and abbreviate the forms of the tickets, checks
and waybills issued to the public, and especially to omit many
8 Article 17.
9 Article 20 (1).
10 Article 25. Roman law, "Dolus"; German law, "Vorsatz."
11 Baggage equivalents: 1929 1933 1946
USA $10.00 $16.58 $16.58
UK £2 £ 3.31 £ 4
12 Property in passenger's possession, equivalents:
1929 1933 1946
USA $200.00 $331.67 $331.67
UK £ 50 £ 80 £100
13 U.S. Treaty Series No. 931; 51 U.S. Stat. at L. 233. For texts and tables
of ratification and legislation see KNAUTH, Ocean Bills of Lading, (2nd. ed.
1940).14 Articles 18 and 20 (1). The Ocean Bill of Lading Convention also lists
17 causes of loss for which the owner (upon proof of due diligence to make the
vessel seaworthy) shall not be liable; the Warsaw Convention has no similar list.
15 Article 20 (2).
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of the statements now required describing the services un-
dertaken by the contract to be performed for the patron.
(2) To re-arrange the baggage liability provisions.
(3) To change the cargo liability provisions.
In addition, there are numerous scattered proposals to change the
text in many respects. A survey of the matter may therefore be timely.
THE PART PLAYED BY THE AIR CARRIERS
Although the air carriers lent their support to the Convention
,upon the occasion of its ratification at Warsaw, and in the course of
numerous subsequent steps necessary for ratification by each of the
33 States which has taken such action, their association, The Inter-
national Air Traffic Association (IATA), did not at first fully accept
it, and drafted a uniform ticket and air waybill "based on" the Con-
vention which, upon being tested in court proceedings, were declared
to be invalid. The Convention provides that the carrier must state
on the ticket and waybill that the passenger, baggage or goods are car-
ried under the terms of the Warsaw Convention. 17 The IATA's ad-
visers thought it inconvenient to have two forms of tickets, one form
for "Warsaw" business, the other for "non-Warsaw" business. They
professed to fear that booking clerks would make errors in selecting
the proper forms, and that a "non-Warsaw" passenger might erro-
neously be handed a "Warsaw" form ticket, with the result that the
carrier, instead of contracting out of all liability' would find itself
contractually liable for $8,291. And if a "Warsaw" passenger were
erroneously handed a "non-Warsaw" form ticket, the error would
deprive the carrier of the $8,291 limit and leave it exposed to unlim-
ited damages.19
In an effort to obtain the maximum advantage of both systems of
law, the IATA evolved a clause designed to straddle all situations, in
the following words:
"The General Conditions of Carriage of Goods are applicable to both
internal and international carriage. These General Conditions are based upon
the Convention of Warsaw of October 12, 1929, in so far as concerns inter-
national carriage within the special meaning of the said Convention."
The test case 20 concerned a lot of gold shipped by the Westminster
18 The prewar IATA consisted of the principal European international air
transport companies: Imperial Airways (UK); Sabena (Belgian); KLM
(Dutch); Air France (French); Lufthansa (German); Ala Littoria (Italian);
Swissair (Swiss); CSA (Czechoslavakian); LOT (Polish); DDL (Danish);
"and a few other overseas companies: PAA (U.S.A.).
17 Articles 3(1) (e) (Passenger ticket); 4(1) (h) (Baggage check); and
8(q) (air waybill).
Is In England, for example, a common carrier may, by express contract be
released from liability for almost any sort of negligence. SHAWCROSS & BEAU-
MONT, Air Law (1945) §§295 and 300. Public policy on this point varies widely
in different countries.
10 Articles 3(2), 4(4) and 9. See Beaumont, "Some Anomalies Requiring
Amendment in the Warsaw Convention of 1929," page 30, supra, in this issue of
the JOURNAL.
20 Westminster Bank, Ltd. v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., [19361 2 All E.R.
890, 1936 USAvR 39; see also, Philippson v. Imperial Airways, Ltd. [1939] 1 All
E.R. 761, 1939 USAvR 63.
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Bank from London to Paris and stolen en route. The British courts
declared that the IATA clause (above quoted) did not comply with
the Warsaw requirement that the air waybill shall contain "a state-
ment that the carriage is subject to the rules relating to liability es-
tablished by the Convention." They further found that the air car-
rier was carrying the gold in "international carriage" in the sense of
the Warsaw Convention 21 and accordingly concluded that the air car-
rier, having failed to issue an air waybill for the gold in the terms
required by the Convention, was "deprived" of the defenses which
"exclude or limit" its liability.2 Hence, the carrier was held liable
for the full value of the lost gold, regardless of whether there was neg-
ligence, and regardless of the cause of the loss.
Thereupon the IATA revised its clauses to comply exactly with
the Convention's requirements, and the airlines began using two
forms: one set for "Warsaw" traffic, the other for "non-Warsaw" traf-
fic. This practice has continued to the present day. It has become
less and less onerous as the acceptance of the Warsaw Convention has
spread from State to State, until today it is easier to list the countries
which have failed to accept it. And today, the IATA opposes revision
at this time; it finds the Convention workable.
VIEWS OF OTHER COMMERCIAL BODIES
Views on revision have been expressed by some non-carrier organi-
zations. The International Chamber of Commerce at its 9th Congress
in 1937 adopted a resolution 23 advising a redraft of the Warsaw pro-
visions as to liability for delay "when this Convention is revised"
under its Article 41. At its 10th Congress in 1939, it considered
revision of the Convention and approved 24 the- report of its Commis-
sion on Air Transport making a number of proposals for revision.2 5
But its Air Transport Committee has, since the war, taken exactly the
opposite view.2 0 The International Union of Aviation IVisurers which
has re-assembled its surviving postwar membership in London, seems
to favor a broad revision.27  Few other public bodies appear to have
looked into the matter or expressed any views.2 8
EXPERIENCE PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II
Experience under the Warsaw Convention vwas limited to about 6
years in British and European interstate passenger traffic and to the
21 See note 3, supra.
22 See notes 14 and 15, supra; SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, cit. supra, §§40
and 370.
231. C. of C., 9th Congress (Berlin, 1937), Resolution No. 9, Part IV.
241. C. of C., 10th Congress (Copenhagen, 1939), Resolution No. 21, Part V.
25 Document No. 12 of the 10th Congress (Document No. 6884 of the Com-
mission on Air Transportation, April 13, 1939). The proposals adopted by the
Commission on Air Transportation at its meeting of February 27, 1939 were
based on a report by Major K. M. Beaumont, General Reporter.
20 1. C. of C. (postwar) Paris, October 1946. See CITEJA Cairo Doc. No. 1.
27 CITEJA Cairo Doc. 11. See PICAO Doc. 2359, LG/5, 29/11/46 at page 10.
28 The PICAO does not seem to have asked specifically whether there is an
interest in revision, and several groups have apparently considered that this
question was not asked.
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U. S.-Brazilian, U. S.-Bermudan and San Francisco-Hong Kong pas-
senger lines. The business of carrying goods by air was not effectively
developed before 1939, and the few claims of the period gave no useful
inkling as to how the statistics of large-scale cargo transport would
develop. In passenger traffic, about 150 claims were handled with
substantial satisfaction.
A review of the litigated cases of the prewar period sheds some
light. Grein v. Imperial Airways, Ltd.29 concerned a return trip pas-
senger from London to Brussels who lost his life when the plane un-
accountably hit a radio mast in a dense fog during the return trip. The
carrier had no witnesses who could say that the accident happened
without negligence. Belgium at that time had not ratified the Con-
vention and one of the questions was whether a ticket from Croydon
to Brussels, and back to Croydon, was a contract to transport from one
place in England to another place in England via an agreed foreign
stopping place. The lower court said it was not, and as the carrier had
not otherwise contracted out of its liability for negligence, gave the
widow damages of £4,000.30 But the English Court of Appeal re-
versed; it found that the return-trip contract contemplated a transpor-
tation from a place in England to a place-in England via an agreed
foreign stopping place, and hence reduced the widow's recovery to the
Warsaw standard, which was then £1670. Eight years later the New
York Court of Appeals adopted the same view and applied it to a
passenger who bought a return-trip ticket from New York to Lisbon
(Portugal not having ratified the Convention) and was killed when
the plane crashed while endeavoring to land at Lisbon on the outward
flight.31 While the courts of other States are free to take the opposite
view, it would now seem reasonable to expect that these two leading
cases, in courts of high renown, would in similar circumstances be
followed: Hence, an amendment of the Convention to state this rule
may merely be a codification of the case law.
Noakes and Miller v. Imperial Airways, Ltd.32 concerned the Brit-
ish flying boat, "Cavalier," flying between New York and Bermuda
which fell on the southward flight when ice formed in the carburetors,
causing the engines to fail. The passengers donned life belts and
floated together in "the Gulf Stream water until a rescuing vessel
reached the scene; by that time, two had died of exposure. Upon pre-
liminary motions the court decided that the U. S. Death on the High
Seas Act 3 gave a cause of action in the courts of the United States (if
the foreign airline could be found in that country), and also decided
that a flying boat was not a "vessel" in the sense of the statutes relat-
29 [1937] 1 K.B. 50; [1936] All E.R. 1258; 1936 USAvR 211.
30 [1935] 53 LI.L. R51; 1936 USAvR 184.
31 Garcia and Alvarez v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 268 App. Div. 850, 55
N.Y.S. (2nd) 317, 526, 1945 USAvR 39, (1945) 295 N.Y. 852, 67 N.E. (2nd) 257.
The U.S. Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari because the action of
the New York Court was not "final," 328 U.S. - , 67 S. Ct. 79 (Oct. 14, 1946).
32 29 F. Supp. 412, 1939 USAvR 1.
s8 U.S. High Seas Death Act, 1920, 46 U.S. Code 761.
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ing to the limitation of the liability of the owners of vessels.3 4 Before
a trial could be had, the claims were settled, in each case for more than
the Warsaw Convention limit of $8,921.
There was one German case35 where a Deutch Lufthans transport
fell in the Alps while flying from Milan to Frankfort; it lost altitude
suddenly while in a lofty cloud mass and ice-formation was suspected.
At the last, the plane came into a narrow valley and fell while the pilot
was trying to maneuver for a forced landing. The carrier endeavored
to defeat liability by showing that there was no negligence, and the
plaintiff endeavored to obtain large damages by showing that there
was gross negligence (Grobe Fahrlassigkeit). The court ruled against
both parties, and hence awarded damages at the Warsaw limit, which
in German money was 20,000 Reichsmarks.
There was an Italian case: 36 a seaplane passing from Tripoli to
Rome via Malta caught fire in Malta harbor due to a fuel pipe break-
ing. Two passengers who suffered loss sued under the Italian domes-
tic air transport law. The suit should have been brought under the
Warsaw Convention, but the Italian law and the Convention were
then substantially the same on the relevant points. The trial court
gave the passengers a decree; the Corte de Cassazione reversed and sent
the case back for re-trial on the issue of whether the air carrier's up-
keep of the fuel pipe and fittings satisfied the requirement of "neces-
sary measures to prevent the loss." The further outcome of this case
is not reported.
REFORMS DESIRED BY CARRIERS
In 1938 there began to be complaints by air carriers that the re-
quirements of the Convention as to compulsory statements in the
ticket, baggage check and waybill were somewhat onerous, and it was
suggested that these could safely be simplified by a protocol without in
any way altering the basic principles or disturbing the 32 (now 33)
ratifications which had been obtained. At the Fourth International
Conference on Air Law held in Brussels in September 1938 - when
many minds were disturbed by the Munich crisis then at its height -
a resolution introduced by the British delegate, Sir Maurice Amos,
was adopted in the following language: 37
"Considering that the Convention signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929,
for the unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by
air has been in force for several years as between numerous countries,
"Considering the importance of preserving harmony between international
conventions and the ever-increasing developments of aviation,
34 To similar effect, see Choy v. Pan American Airways Co., 1941 USAvR 93;
Wyman and Bartlett v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 181 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.(2nd) 420, 1943 USAvR 1; aff'd 267 App. Div. 947, 48 N.Y.S. (2nd) 459.
35 Cited as Frankfurt a/ Main Landgericht, 2/7.0.169/37. See Archiv ffir
Luftrecht, Vol. 9, p. 180. A translation of this decision will appear in the April
1947 issue of the JOURNAL.
36 Soc. di Nay. Aerea v. Palleroni, Court of Cassation, Rome, March 31,
1938: Archiv fir Luftrecht, Vol. 8, p. 155.
37 Resolution D, Report of the American Delegation to the Secretary of
State (U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1939), page 94.
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"Considering the usefulness of the preparatory collaboration by the Inter-
national Technical Committee of Aerial Legal Experts,
"Charges the International Technical Committee of Aerial Legal Experts
with the duty of making a study of the Convention at Warsaw on October 12,
1929, for the unification of certain rules relating to international transporta-
tion by air, with a view to determining whether, from the experience acquired
in the application of this Convention, it would be necessary to improve the
text thereof, and, if so, with the duty of preparing the desired modifications
or amendments in the form of a draft."
As the shadows of World War II were closing in during the early
months of 1939, the International Chamber of Commerce and the
IATA both adopted resolutions favoring.a revision, and in May 1940,
Sir Maurice Amos, who had been appointed Reporter, submitted a
report commenting upon and adopting many of the proposals made by
the International Chamber of Commerce. 8 In that position, the mat-
ter rested during the six years of World War II, in the course of which
Sir Maurice died, and the IATA ceased to function, and the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce suspended its activities.
THE WAR YEARS, 1939-1945
During this period, transatlantic flying began in earnest, and trans-
pacific flying by Pan American increased. All the European interstate
lines were, however, disrupted and destroyed. Experience of the prac-
tical workings of the Warsaw Convention was in the main suspended.
The situation of Portugal attracted special attention because that
neutral country became the principal outlet of numberless refugees
by sea or by air. As Portugal had failed to ratify the Warsaw Conven-
tion, the outbound refugees were necessarily carried without the bene-
fits of the Convention, and their rights, when travelling from Lisbon
to America, were governed by the law of Portugal (if a suit was brought
there) or by the law of the State to which they travelled. A serious
accident at Lisbon emphasized the situation: a flying boat arriving
from New York fell while endeavoring to land on the River Tagus
causing numerous deaths and injuries. The cause of the accident was
not determined. Many of the passengers were in transit to French
North Africa, where the Warsaw Convention prevailed, limiting each
claim to $8,291. Some passengers had one-way tickets to Lisbon, so
that they were not bound by the Convention and could recover only
if they could satisfy a court and jury that there had been negligence,
and if so, recover whatever damages they could show had been suffered.
One passenger travelling only to Lisbon had a return ticket, and as
above stated, 9 the New York courts held that the air carrier's liability
was accordingly governed by the Convention and awarded a recovery
of $8,291 without proof of negligence. A New York court has stated
the theory of the Convention in the following words: 40
38 CITEJA Doe. 394, May 1940.
89 See note 31,
40 Wyman & Bartlett v. Pan American Airways, Inc. 43 N.Y.S. (2nd) 420;
1943 USAvR 1, 2-3 (1943).
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"The Warsaw Convention rules are applicable only to international flights
and raise a presumption of liability on the part of the carrier for injury or
death to a passenger (Articles 17 and 20) limited to 125,000 francs or approxi-
mately $8,300 under the rate of exchange fixed (Article 22) except where the
carrier is guilty of 'wilful misconduct' (Article 25)."
POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS
When the war finally ended in the summer of 1945, numerous
international organizations resumed their activities in one form or
another. The IATA was wholly reorganized. 41  The International
Chamber of Commerce reconstituted its Secretariat, but has not yet
held a Congress. 42 The CITEJA resumed its work in January 1946,
and met again in July and November. 43
When the CITEJA first met at Paris in January 1946, one of the
new British delegates, Major K. M. Beaumont, proposed a discussion
for simplifying the ticket and waybill requirements. It was indicated
that there was an urgent demand by the managers of airlines for a
simple reform of this character. It was, however, then understood
that there was no proposal of any change in the fundamental principles
of the Convention'- the burden of proof, the limitation of liability,
the division of cargo risks, the time limits, and the like. Mr. Beau-
mont was chosen Reporter on this subject and a draft Protocol of
minor amendments of detail was prepared, accepted4 4 and sent to the
PICAO for consideration.45 There the matter rested until the First
Assembly of PICAO met at Montreal in May 1946.40 It had a crowded
calendar, and brought together many delegates whose approach to air
law and the problems of conflict of laws (or private international law)
had been tinged and shaped under the pressures and turmoils of war
and the Great Alliance which eventually overthrew the Axis. Many
of the prewar experts had disappeared from the scene, by death, by
detention behind distant frontiers, by association with the defeated
Axis nations and their collaborators. The pace of postwar airline
activity was astonishingly fast, and the desire to serve, direct and ad-
41 The postwar organization consists of over 50 airlines. See, "IATA-
1946 Activities," page 82, infra, of this issue of the JOURNAL.
42 A Congress is planned for the summer of 1947.
43 The postwar CITEJA has simply dropped Germany, Austria, Hungary and
Japan from its lists. Italian delegates, who came to its 1939 meetings, have been
allowed to participate unhindered. Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia appear
on the lists of member States, but have sent no delegates since 1938.
44 Resolution 143 of XIVth Session CITEJA, January 1946.
10 In prior years, the CITEJA invariably sent its completed texts to a dip-
lomatic conference on private air law invited by a sponsoring government: Poland
in 1929, Italy in 1933, Belgium in 1938. The PICAO in 1946 invited the CITEJA
to send its texts to Montreal in the expectation that the delegates to the Assem-
bly of PICAO would have credentials to act also as a Conference on Private Air
Law. However, many delegates were not actually so accredited in May 1946, and
no "diplomatic action" was taken. The CITEJA experts particularly requested
PICAO to enlarge their group, for the purposes of diplomatic action respecting
private air law texts, by inviting all States not members of PICAO. However,
PICAO did not issue such invitations and was at most willing to let non-member
Italy attend on an observer basis without a vote.
40 1946 USAvR 73, 75. The PICAO Secretariat thereupon prepared a draft
of revision of the Warsaw Convention embodying the amendments adopted by
CITEJA in January 1946, adding final provisions. See PICAO Doc. 1561, A-11
of April 20, 1946.
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vance it in the public interest, for safety and for effective service, was
quite natural.
A Legal Commission was set up 47 and the CITEJA's resolution
and text were referred to it, together with several other difficult prob-
lems. In the outcome, the PICAO Assembly sent the matter back to
the CITEJA with the following resolution: 48
"WHEREAS The First Interim Assembly of the Provisional International
Civil Aviation Organization is of the opinion that consideration of more ex-
tensive revision of the Convention of Warsaw than is contained in the amend-
ments proposed by CITEJA is desirable, in view of the rapid development of
air transport in recent years, and particularly during the current period:
"And that greater ultimate good will accrue to international air transport
if more extensive revision as aforesaid is considered, even at the expense of
further delay,
"It is Therefore RESOLVED:
a) That there shall not, at this first Interim Assembly, be formulated or adopt-
ed any protocol or similar document amendatory to the Convention of War-
saw;
b) That the matter of amendment to the Convention of Warsaw should be
referred back to CITEJA with a request that CITEJA, or any other body
which may succeed to the functions of CITEJA, should review the entire con-
vention for the purpose of considering the need of a more complete and ex-
tensive revision thereof in the light of recent experience in air transportation,
and of technical studies now being undertaken by PICAO, IATA and others;
c) That member States and those States not members of PICAO represented
at this Assembly should be invited to furnish to the Council as soon as possi-
ble any additional views on the subject;
d) That if the need for such further revision is indicated, the Council shall
present to the next Assembly either appropriate amendments to the present
convention, or a new draft convention on the same subject-matters as are
comprised in the Convention of Warsaw; and
e) That a copy of this Resolution shall be transmitted to the members of
PICAO, other States represented at this Assembly, CITEJA, IATA and such
other parties as the Council deems advisable with a request that proposals for
amendment of the convention may be sent to the Council of PICAO as soon
as practicable."
This struck the CITEJA experts meeting in Paris in July as a
bomb-shell. Hastily abandoning their carefully organized agenda,
they undertook to explore in what respects the Convention could be
re-cast, not merely in detail, but also in principle. There was little
time for a sound discussion; a Questionnaire was 'prepared by the Re-
porter 40 and a further Questionnaire was submitted by another ex-
pert.50 These were sent to all the CITEJA experts and evoked a flood
of responses. 51 Meanwhile the PICAO Secretariat sent the same ques-
47 Commission No. 4 (Legal Problems).
48 PICAO Assembly Resolution No. XXX (PICAO Doc. 1843, A/47 of June
13 (1946).
40 CITEJA Doc. 438-Questionnaire on the Revision of the Warsaw Conven-
tion (19 questions) by Mr. Beaumont (U.K.), Reporter.
50 CITEJA Doc. 439-Questionnaire concerning the Amendment of the War-
saw Convention by Mr. Georgiades (Greece).
51 List of CITEJA responses: CITEJA Cairo Doc. C-1 (International Cham-
ber of Commerce); Doc. C-3 (Irish); Doe. C-5 (PICAO memo); Doc. C-11
(IUAI); Docs. C-9 & C-12 (IATA); Doc. C-16 (UK); Docs. C-17 & C-20 (U.S.
Underwriters); Doc. C-23 (Belgium); CITEJA Doc. 442 (Greek); Doc. 443
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tions to the 57 Governments with which it has relations; the Govern-
ments were much slower in answering.52 Without waiting for any
of the responses, whether from CITEJA experts or from governments,
the CITEJA Reporter drafted a wholly new projet de' convention and
submitted it for discussion at the Cairo meetings of the CITEJA in
November 1946., s In December he prepared a further revision based
on the Cairo discussions.54
As the proposed scope of revision expanded, opposition to any re-
vision began to become manifest. The American CITEJA Advisory
Committee found that there was no American interest in disturbing
the present Convention, which was regarded by representatives of
many divergent interests as fair and satisfactory. The postwar IATA,
meeting in general session at Cairo in October with 52 member air-
lines, expressed itself strongly against any revision at this time, and
proceeded to draft forms of documents in full accord with the present
Convention's requirements.55 The Air Transport Committee of the
International Chamber of Commerce resolved to oppose a revision.66
The Irish and the Scandinavian Governments expressed themselves
against revision.57  The three American aviation insurance groups
expressed opposition.5" Consequently, the CITEJA's experts con-
tented themselves with a non-binding discussion of the Reporter's text,
resulting in an elaborated series of "Notes" (Summary of Discus-
sions) 59 which were transmitted to the PICAO.6 0 The matter now
rests with the PICAO which' hopes, in May 1947, to reorganize as the
permanent ICAO and to add to its organization a Legal Committee
competent to do such drafting as may be desired. At the moment,
the evidence seems to be that the great airlines, speaking through the
IATA, and the powerful American underwriting groups, are opposed
to any revision at this time.
(Danish); Doe. 444 (French); Doe. 446 (Egyptian); Doc. 449 (Italian); Doc.
453 (Netherlands); Doc. 455 (Norwegian); Does. 458 & 459 (Greek); Does. 464
& 465 (Polish); Doc. 466 (Swedish).
52 Some twenty Government answers which had reached PICAO were para-
phrased in CITEJA Cairo Doe. C-5. The U.S. Government's answer to the PICAO
is not yet released.
53 CITEJA Doe. 445-Report on the Revision of the Warsaw Convention
and Draft Convention by Major K. M. Beaumont, September 1946.
54 The text of this revision is set forth on page 87 ff., infra, of this issue of
the JOURNAL.
55 See CITEJA Cairo Does. C-9 & C-12. See PICAO Doe. 2359, LG/5,
29/11/46 at page 8.
56 International Chamber of Commerce Air Transport Committee at Paris,
October 1946. See CITEJA Cairo Doc. C-1.
57 See CITEJA Cairo Doe. C-3, CITEJA Does. 443, 455 & 466.
58 See CITEJA Cairo Does. C-17 & C-20.
59 CITEJA Doc. 472, Nov. 17, 1946-Summary of Discussions of the New
Draft Convention annexed to the Report of Major K. M. Beaumont. Significant
portions of these discussions are found in the footnotes appended to text of the
Beaumont draft of revision of December 1946, commencing page 87, infra, of
this issue of the JOURNAL.
60 CITEJA Plenary Resolutions No. 157-9, Nov. 17, 1946. See page 81, infra.
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SOME SUGGESTED REFORMS
Statements Required on Tickets, Checks and Waybills
Over-elaboration of the required statements was the original com-
plaint in 1938 against the Warsaw Convention. This complaint has,
for the moment, been laid aside; for the IATA at Cairo in October
1946 took, the view that the present requirements can reasonably be
complied with. Carriers always wish to keep their documents as short
and non-binding as possible. The ideal carrier's ticket merely would
say: " X Airline, one passenger, New York to Bombay. For terms
see tariff on file." Their customers, however, usually want to know
more exactly what performance is promised in exchange for the price
paid' Insurance companies, banks and financing institutions, freight
brokers and agcncies, and the families, business associates and ad-
ministrators of passengers (killed or severely injured in remote foreign
lands) all have a legitimate interest in knowing the terms of trans-
portation agreed to. When the journey is long and passes from one
country to another the need for explicit statement is enhanced. The
public interest would seem to justify the present requirements of the
Convention. Indeed, as devices for control of international rates are
developed, it could be necessary to add more data, rather than to sub-
tract from that now required. For instance, the U. S. Maritime Com-
mission is considering a requirement that every ocean bill of lading
shall include the rate schedule. It would, in American practice, be
quite unfair to let a mass-shipper in the U. S. - U. K. trade have the
benefit of "flat rates" or "agreed charges" such as are permitted by the
British Road and Rail Traffic Act."'
Baggage Valuations
-The baggage valuation provisions might be re-fiamed. At present,
"checked baggage" is valued at some $16.58 per kilo, and the passen-
ger's clothing, the contents of his pockets and handbags, etc. is given
a lump value. While there is no argument about a loss by a crash,
it is suggested that a theft or a mere loss by the passenger's carelessness
is not adequately dealt with. The values might be fixed per passen-
ger, rather than per kilo. However, such proposals would not justify
disturbing the present settled structure of ratifications.
The Allocation of Cargo Loss and Damage Risks
There are, rather obviously, three possible solutions of the rela-
tions between the air carrier and the owner of damaged cargo. At
one extreme, all the risks of loss and damage can be imposed on the
air carrier; this is in effect the "all risks insured" air waybill or bill of
lading. A prominent result of this system is a high rate, for the carrier
must be paid not only for the carriage but for the' cost of cargo insur-
61 Under that Act, for instance, a chain store company may contract with
a railway to have all its goods carried for a year for an agreed flat rate charge.
See 14 ICC Prac. J. 114.
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ance as well. Insured bills of lading have long been familiar in the
Great Lakes and Atlantic coastwise package trades.62
At the other extreme, the risks can all be imposed on the owner of
the cargo, and he may insure them, in whole or in part, as he may see
fit. This system results in cheap rates, for the carrier is paid only for
the carriage. This arrangement has long been sanctioned by the Brit-
ish courts as quite compatible with public policy, provided only, that
the language of the bill of lading is explicit and clear, and frankly
advises the consignor of the goods what transport risks are borne by
the goods owner. Sixty years ago the New York courts63 accepted the
British view, but the United States courts began to denounce various
ocean carriers' exception clauses as contrary to public policy; the re-
sult was the federal Harter Act of 189304 which imposed a divided-risk
solution on all our courts, federal and state.
The third solution is a division of the risks at some fair line. The
common law of England, in stage-coach days, drew the line at the Act
of God, the acts of the King's enemies, and the inherent vice of the
goods. There is an implied warranty that the ship is seaworthy, the
coach or car roadworthy, the airplane airworthy. By statute, Parlia-
ment excused loss by fire on shipboard unless caused by the shipown-
er's act or neglect.65 This common-law is also the law in the United
States. 6 It imposes a great many losses on the carrier and results in
smaller profits or higher rates, which in international unrestricted com-
petition discourage getting business from carriers who operate under
other laws. British and other foreign ocean carriers have succeeded
for many years in offering low rates because their courts gave effect to
specific bill of lading clauses excepting the carrier from liability for
negligence; but eventually this became extremely unsatisfactory to
their customers. 67 A much more practical and workable division of
the risks is stated in the U. S. Harter Act of 1893, which has been
successively adopted by Canada, Australia, and New Zealand 8 and,
after 1924, spread over most of the world (except Latin America) in
the form of the Ocean'Bill of Lading Convention. 69 This system re-
lieves the water carrier who has provided a seaworthy ship at the start
of the voyage of losses due to errors of management and navigation,
but imposes on the carrier full liability for the receipt, custody, care,
stowage and delivery of the goods. The French describe this as the
separation of fautes nautiques from fautes commerciales; the Italians
62 See The Dixon-King, 301 U.S. 696, 1937 A.M.C. 697.
63 Rubens v. Ludjate, Hill S.S. Co. (1892, 1st. Dept.) 20 N.Y. Supp. 481 at
485-486; affirmed without opinion, 143 N.Y. 629 (1894). See also Robertson v.
National S.S. Co. (1891) 139 N.Y. 416.
64 Act of Feb. 13, 1893. 46 U.S. Code 190-196.
65 57 & 58 Vict. ch. 60 (1894).
66 R.S. 4282; 46 U.S. Code 182.
67 See Historical review in KNAUTH, Ocean Bills of Lading, (2nd ed., 1940)
page 99.
68 Canada Water Carriage of Goods. (1910), 9 and 10 Edw. 7, Ch. 61; later
re-enacted as Rev. Stat. 1927, ch. 207; Australia (1904) and New Zealand (1908).69 Brussels, 25 August, 1929, U.S. Treaty Series No. 931, 51 U.S. Stat. at
L. 233.
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similarly phrase it'as colpa nautica and colpa commerciale. Fifty years
experience with this system has amply demonstrated that it works well;
the carrier is compelled to accept sufficient risks to prod him into a
reasonable amount of care without unduly raising the rate charged
for carriage, and the goods owner assumes a sufficiently large group of
risks to give him adequate business choices as to whether to carry his
own risks, or to insure some or all of them. This division of risks,
first enacted in 1893, has had an expanding success; no trade that has
adopted it has ever abandoned it for another. It now governs ocean
trades throughout the British Empire and the Commonwealths (ex-
cept South Africa) and throughout Europe and in the United States.
It was adopted for international air transport by the Warsaw Conven-
tion in 1929.
The Beaumont proposals of September 1946 propose to abandon
it by dropping Article 20 (2) which contains the essential language
that the air carrier shall not be liable for losses of air cargoes due to
pilot errors in navigation or in management. Thus it would saddle
the losses due to pilot errors on the air carrier. The economic result
would obviously be to raise the rates which must be charged by the
air carrier for transport, and to limit the freedom of the customers of
the airlines to decide for themselves whether they wish to insure such
risks of loss. The goods owner today is free, when his goods move un-
der the Warsaw Convention of 1929, to insure or not, through his own
broker and with an underwriter of his own choice with whom he
makes his own bargain as to premiums and extent of coverage. It is a
primary transaction concerning his own risks. If Article 20 (2) is
abandoned, the customer will be forced to pay the carrier for assuming
these risks; and if he also insures them with his own underwriter (fear-
ing that the carrier may become insolvent or resort to technical de-
fenses), this will be a secondary transaction; his underwriter will by
subrogation assert his rights against the carrier. The proposal to drop
Article 20 (2) is thus a device.to increase the air carrier's risks which
will in turn justify an increase in the rates. If the air carrier is a
government, the solvency of the carrier is doubtless assured; and the
business man need merely fear the slow methods of bureaucracy in the
handling of claims. If the air carrier is a private enterprise, there is
always the risk of insolvency, especially if there is a bad series of acci-
dents, in which event it may be vain to rely on the carrier to pay the
losses for which it is liable and for assuming which it has been paid as
part of the rate. As long as there are private carriers, Article 20 (2)
should not be stricken.
